### A2 “say no”

#### Cuba would say yes

EDWARD P. DJEREJIAN, 2011, Founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, is a former U.S. ambassador to Syria and to Israel; Lane is a senior fellow in science and technology policy at the Baker Institute as well as the Malcolm Gillis University Professor and a professor of physics and astronomy at Rice University; Matthews is a fellow in science and technology policy at the Baker Institute and a lecturer for the Wiess School of Natural Sciences at Rice University. “Science, diplomacy and international collaboration”  
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Science-diplomacy-and-international-collaboration-1683250.php

The recent dramatic events taking place in the broader Middle East pose major challenges for the United States, making it all the more important that the Obama administration craft policies that respond to the dynamics of change in the region. One often-neglected but powerful diplomatic tool is known as "science diplomacy," the sharing of scientific information and establishing scientific collaborations with nations in which the United States has limited political relations. Polls show that American scientific research is widely respected throughout the world, even in nations whose citizens do not, overall, have a positive opinion of the United States. For instance, a 2004 Zogby poll showed that only 11 percent of Moroccans have a positive view of the United States, but 90 percent had a favorable view of U.S. science. Of 43 countries surveyed, U.S. science exceeded the general favorability of the United States by an average of 23 points. For this reason, it is often possible to establish constructive discussions and cooperative scientific efforts, especially ones that relate to food, water, health, energy and other human needs, when other channels of communication are closed.

### 2AC EE = trade only

### 2AC EE C/I

#### Counter interpretation economic engagement is influencing the political behavior of a state through economic means

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security- measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Plan is economic means – promotes trade and investment

State Department (“Science and Technology Cooperation”, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/stc/)

Thirty U.S. S&T Agreements worldwide establish bilateral frameworks to facilitate the exchange of scientific results, provide for protection and allocation of intellectual property rights and benefit sharing, facilitate access for researchers, address taxation issues, and respond to the complex set of issues associated with economic development, domestic security and regional stability. S&T cooperation supports the establishment of science-based industries, encourages investment in national science infrastructure, education and the application of scientific standards, promotes international trade and dialogue on issues of direct import to global security, such as protection of the environment and management of natural resources. S&T collaboration assists USG agencies to establish partnerships with counterpart institutions abroad. These relationships enable them to fulfill their individual responsibilities by providing all parties with access to new resources, materials, information, and research. High priority areas include such areas as agricultural and industrial biotechnology research (including research on microorganisms, plant and animal genetic materials, both aquatic and terrestrial), health sciences, marine research, natural products chemistry, environment and energy research.

#### Aff ground – Discussing science diplomacy is key to policy analysis

Cathy Campbell, 2010, President and chief executive officer of CRDF Global - an independent nonprofit organization that promotes international scientific and technical collaboration, “Send in the Scientists: Why Mobilizing America’s Researchers Makes Sense for Diplomacy”  
http://scienceprogress.org/2010/10/send\_scientists/

What is needed for science diplomacy to succeed? First, we must continue to educate the international research community, policymakers, and the public about the importance of science diplomacy. Earlier this year, CRDF Global joined with the Partnership for a Secure America and the American Association for the Advancement of Science to highlight the importance of science diplomacy.

#### Reasonability – competing interpretations is infinitely regressive – they’ll always move the goal post

**CICEP, 13** (The Commission on Innovation, Competitiveness and Economic Prosperity (CICEP) is a working group of the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU). Through regular workshops and meetings, the Commission works on building tools, resources, and standards of practice that universities can use to make the most effective contributions to innovation and economic growth, and to communicate their value in these areas. Members of CICEP include representatives from APLU institution's offices of: academic affairs; research and graduate administration; public and governmental affairs; business and engineering departments; outreach and economic development; technology transfer; and entrepreneurship programs; <http://www.aplu.org/document.doc?id=4431>) KD

I just javaed the date still camp ev

A university conducts its economic development work in a geographic footprint. Sometimes we refer to this geographic footprint as community or region, or we modify it with words like local, state, national, or international to help clarify the geographic area being served. This document will use the word ‘community’ to define the geographic area being served, recognizing that the service area specified for or assumed by the institution (i.e., the city, county, region, state(s), nation, or world) varies by institution and by the specific program or economic development activity. Similarly, the term “economic engagement” has various interpretations across the higher education community. Its use in this tool is meant to help guide campus conversations, not prescribe a particular view of how an institution defines its contributions to its community.

### 2ac cir

#### The plan’s popular

**DeWeerd, 1** – writer in seatte, cites Nick Smith, a republican rep from MI, (Sarah, “Embargoing Science: US Policy toward Cuba and Scientific Collaboration” 2001)ahayes

These relatively streamlined procedures have been in place since 1999, when the Clinton administration announced a new policy to expand people-to-people contacts-such as scientific exchanges-between the United States and Cuba. Scientific collaboration between the two countries continues to enjoy broad bipartisan support in Washington. Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI), who visited Cuba in April as part of a delegation organized by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, says that scientific collaboration is "one area that's reasonable" for contact with Cuba. "There are some things we can learn from them, and certainly many things they can learn from the scientific effort in this country."

#### Won’t pass

Kasperowicz, 12/4

[Pete, 7:39 pm, Capitol Hill Publishing Corp, “Dem melts down on House floor over immigration,” http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/floor-speeches/192122-dem-melts-down-on-house-floor-over-immigration, 12/5/13, JAZ]

Rep. Jared Polis (D-Colo.) on Wednesday night lost his cool on the House floor over the issue of immigration, after the presiding officer warned another Democrat not to refer to people sitting in the House gallery. [WATCH VIDEO]¶ Democrats were calling for House passage of a comprehensive immigration bill, and Rep. Joe Garcia (D-Fla.) used his remarks to note supporters of such a bill that were sitting in the gallery.¶ When he was done, the presiding officer, Rep. Jackie Walorski (R-Ind.) issued the standard warning that members are not supposed to refer to people in the gallery. That's when Polis confronted Walorski.¶ "Madame Speaker, the gentle people in the gallery… would not have to be in the gallery… advocating if this House simply took up the bill," he began. "Do you think they want to be spending their time here, Madame Speaker? Is that what you think?"¶ "And you're saying we're addressing them, and that's what you're upset about Madame Speaker?" he continued, moving into a full scream. "I want you, Madame Speaker, to address the reason that they are here! They are here because our government is tearing apart their families, Madame Speaker!"¶ Walorski interrupted by saying all members are instructed not to address people in the gallery, but Polis shot back: "I want the Speaker to understand that the Speaker is obstructing H.R. 15 from coming to the floor!"¶ H.R. 15 is the House Democratic counterpart to the Senate's immigration bill, which House GOP leaders have said they would not take up.¶ Walorski tried to interrupt by saying Polis was out of order, as Polis continued to bark, "Will the Speaker understand that? Will the Speaker understand that?"¶ Polis quickly calmed down and continued his remarks about the need for an immigration bill. He said until a bill passes, people will continue to sit in the gallery — "perhaps against your wishes," he said to Walorski.

#### Forcing controversial fights key to Obama’s agenda

Dickerson 13 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, 1/18 www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

#### Piecemeal passage solves

Foley 10/29 (Elise Foley, reporter; Huffington Post; 10/29/2013; “Conservatives Pushing Immigration Reform Say Piecemeal Approach Gains Steam”; <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-conservatives_n_4175758.html>; KDUB)

House Republican leaders have rejected a comprehensive approach, saying they will instead vote on individual pieces of legislation. Though some immigration-related bills have been approved by House committees, they haven't gone to the floor for a vote.¶ Other bills are being drafted, but haven't been released, such as one led by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) and Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) to give legal status to undocumented young people. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) reportedly plans to introduce a bill that would allow undocumented immigrants to stay in the U.S. temporarily while they seek long-term solutions. It's unclear if such a measure could win support, given Republican opposition to so-called "amnesty" and Democratic reluctance to support something without a path to citizenship.¶ House Democrats have introduced a bill of their own and won support from nearly all of their own caucus and two Republicans: Reps. Jeff Denham (R-Calif.) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.). The Democratic bill is a combination of the Senate-passed comprehensive reform legislation -- which includes a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants -- and a separate border security measure approved by the House Homeland Security Committee. The House Democrat-led bill won't get a vote, according to GOP leadership.¶ Based on what he heard from House members, Bailey said he doesn't think a path to citizenship "is going to happen." But Democrats, he said, may be realizing they're better off taking what they can get now and pushing for expanded reforms later.

#### XO solves

The Hill 2-16 (“Dems: Obama can act unilaterally on immigration reform”

http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/283583-dems-recognize-that-obama-can-act-unilaterally-on-immigration-reform#ixzz2LEvg4R5R)

President Obama can – and will – take steps on immigration reform in the event Congress doesn't reach a comprehensive deal this year, according to several House Democratic leaders. While the Democrats are hoping Congress will preclude any executive action by enacting reforms legislatively, they say the administration has the tools to move unilaterally if the bipartisan talks on Capitol Hill break down. Furthermore, they say, Obama stands poised to use them. "I don't think the president will be hands off on immigration for any moment in time," Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.), the head of the House Democratic Caucus, told reporters this week. "He's ready to move forward if we're not." Rep. Joseph Crowley (N.Y.), vice chairman of the Democratic Caucus, echoed that message, saying Obama is "not just beating the drum," for immigration reform, "he's actually the drum major." "There are limitations as to what he can do with executive order," Crowley said Wednesday, "but he did say that if Congress continued to fail to act that he would take steps and measures to enact common-sense executive orders to move this country forward." Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.), who heads the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said there are "plenty" of executive steps Obama could take if Congress fails to pass a reform package. "The huge one," Grijalva said, is "the waiving of deportation" in order to keep families together. "Four million of the undocumented [immigrants] are people who overstayed their visas to stay with family," he said Friday. "So that would be, I think, an area in which … there's a great deal of executive authority that he could deal with." The administration could also waive visa caps, Grijalva said, to ensure that industries like agriculture have ample access to low-skilled labor. "Everybody's for getting the smart and the talented in, but there's also a labor flow issue," he said. To be sure, Obama and congressional Democrats would prefer the reforms to come through Congress – both because that route would solidify the changes into law and because it would require bipartisan buy-in. Still, House Republicans have been loath to accept one of the central elements of Obama's strategy: A pathway to citizenship for the estimated 11-12 million undocumented people currently living in the country – a move which many conservatives deem "amnesty." Indeed, when the House Judiciary Committee met earlier this month on immigration reform, much of the discussion focused on whether there is some middle ground between citizenship and mass deportation. “If we can find a solution that is … short of a pathway to citizenship, but better than just kicking 12 million people out, why is that not a good solution?” Rep. Raul Labrador (R-Idaho) asked during the hearing. Obama on Tuesday spent a good portion of his State of the Union address urging Congress to send him a comprehensive immigration reform bill this year. Central to that package, he said, should be provisions for "strong border security," for "establishing a responsible pathway to earned citizenship" and for "fixing the legal immigration system to cut waiting periods and attract the highly-skilled entrepreneurs and engineers that will help create jobs and grow our economy." "We know what needs to be done," Obama said. "So let’s get this done." Becerra said he and other immigration reformers have had two meetings with the White House on immigration this month, one with the executive team working on the issue and, more recently, with Obama himself. Becerra said administration officials "essentially" know what reforms they want – "and they have communicated that to both House and Senate members, bipartisanly" – but they also want Congress to take the lead. "They're giving Congress a chance to work its will to move this," Becerra said. "But … I don't think he's going to wait too long. "If you were to ask him would he be prepared to submit a bill if Congress isn't ready … he would tell you, I have no doubt, 'I can do it in a heartbeat,'" Becerra added. "The president will move forward where he can if Congress doesn't act."

### 2ac commissions cp

**Counterplans should only compete off of the mandate of the plan not off of the process of implementation of the plan – we should be able to defend the scope of that mandate – its fair and predictable because we’ll defend fiat for purposes of disads**

**their evidence concludes aff**

Kenneth R. **Mayer** Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madiso December, **2007** THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS: IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE RATIONAL POLICY?

BRAC worked. However, the fifth and likely final round demonstrated that the process had evolved from its initial foundations, to the point where it no longer had the same character as the early rounds. The Commission became embroiled in the same political controversies that spurred the BRAC process in the first place, and exercised increasingly broad authority. Increasing Politicization 0 The intent of the BRAC process was to use a “neutral” administrative process to make decisions about which facilities to close. The establishment of clear criteria, and the inability to logroll once the Commission’s recommendations had been made, gave a veneer of objectivity and rationality to the process. The first three rounds went fairly smoothly; indeed, BRAC was hailed as a path breaking innovation that solved a decades-old deadlock, and an entirely sensible way of implementing a rational policy. But during the 4th round in 1995, President Clinton finessed the Commission’s decision to close two large bases in California and Texas, evading the crucial all-or-nothing character of the list of closures. The five existing Air Logistics Centers had an excess capacity of 45% (GAO 1996, 3), and the 1995 BRAC round had slated two ALCs – one at McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento, the other at Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio – for closure. President Clinton could not remove the bases from the list of proposed closure; his approval was all or nothing. But the Administration announced that it would simply replace the military personnel with private contractors who would do the same work (called “privatization in place”). Most of the jobs would stay, even though the bases would be “closed.” The reaction was quick and predictable: even defenders of the BRAC process accused Clinton of manipulating it for political gain, noting that the gambit saved 20,000 jobs in states considered vital in the 1996 presidential election.12 The controversy “led to as much anger and resentment within Congress as there had been in 1976” (Becker 2005), when legislators began putting up the roadblocks that prevented base closures for more than a decade. Despite Defense Department insistence that the infrastructure was still too large and additional closures were necessary, the House and Senate would have none of it (Department of Defense 2004, 3). The 2005 Commission noted the post 1995 experience with efforts to get new rounds authorized: From 1997 to 2000, the House of Representatives repeatedly rejected Administration requests to conduct two additional rounds of base closures in 2001 and 2005. In 1998, the Senate Armed Services Committee rejected an amendment to allow a single round of base closures. Congress allowed statutory authority for BRAC to expire and did not renew it until after the paradigm-shifting September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (2005, 314). Some of this politicization was intentional. Goren notes that after the first round, Congress “opened up” the process by requiring the military to submit an initial list of proposed closures, requiring the Commission to hold hearings and conduct site visits, allowing for public submissions, a d requiring the Commission to conduct some of its deliberations in public. The result had many of the characteristics of a political process. Local communities hired professional lobbyists and consultants to prepare their cases, members of Congress worked to keep their bases off the initial list of proposed military closures, and regional delegations tried to convince the Commission to replace their own bases with those in other areas of the country. By formally allowing the Commission – as well as the Secretary of Defense – to consider the local economic impact of a base closure, Congress permitted a broad degree of discretion In 1993, Secretary of Defense Aspin removed two bases on the initial military list (the Monterey Presidio and McClellan Air Force Base) because of adverse economic effects (Goren 2003, 99). Goren argues that these subsequent changes – which included mandatory site visits, starting with lists of proposed closures submitted by the military services, integrated GAO audits of data, more public submissions,few military personnel on the commission – had the effect of repoliticizing the process. “The newly opened process prompted politicians to take action. Elected officials worried that if they did not publicly take some action, their constituents would blame them if bases were closed in their districts and states. Faced with public hearings, public announcements of the bases to be closed, and a somewhat established, longer-term system, politicians could not reasonably be expected to refrain from trying to influence the base-closing process. The process itself was now regularized and institutionalized; it was no longer a ‘one-time affair’.” (Goren 2003, 89-90). In 1991, the city of Charleston, NC, spent $1 million hiring a D.C. law firm and comparing the costs of closing local navy bases to alternatives in Virginia or New England (Goren 2003, 92). Sorenson (1998) argues that the commission process was highly politicizedfrom the beginning. He cites the appointment of retired politicians and retired military officers, all of whom had their own biases; lobbying the military services to keep favored bases off the initial proposed list of closures; internal log rolling and efforts to spread closures evenly across the services; strategic behavior by the services designed to protect specific installations; and ambiguity in the data, with disputed cost-benefit analysis. In the end, Sorenson concludes, the BRAC model succeeded, but not “without considerable political interference. It came from the services, from the Defense Department, from local officials, from key members of Congress, and from presidents” (1998, 216). The Defense Department was accused of showing favoritism to the services in its reluctance to force joint-service use of bases. The Clinton White House was accused of blatant manipulation in its controversial “Privatization in Place” plan that closed bases in name only by shifting all work to private contractors who would operate out of the same facilities. The Navy was accused of manipulating cost data to close bases according to a predetermined plan (Render 1997)

**6. CP fails – lack of compromise.**

Klein 10 – Ezra Klein, awesome political blogger, “Sins of Commission,” February 19, 2010, online: <http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/02/sins_of_commission.html>

There's nothing magic about a commission. Like a congressional committee, it puts together legislation that Congress later votes to accept, reject or delay. And as of now, there's simply no reason to believe that the votes exist for any serious compromise. Republican leaders, for instance, are arguing that the commission simply shouldn't consider tax increases, which makes a deal impossible. That was their rationale for filibustering the very formation of a commission, which is why Obama had to do this through an executive order. But elites still like the idea, in part because elites can see the outlines of a deal that elites would make. Greg Mankiw for instance, thinks Republicans should demand that the commission include a value-added tax and a carbon tax. I would support that. The problem is that the Republican Party opposes both policies, and there's no reason to believe they're going to change their minds.

**Congress ignores commissions**

Straus and Glassman -12 (Matthew Eric Glassman, Analyst on the Congress, Jacob R. Straus, Analyst on the Congress, Congressional Commissions: Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations, February 15, 2012, CRS Reports, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40076.pdf>)

A third criticism of commissions is that they have high costs and low returns. Congressional commission costs vary widely, ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to over $10 million. Coupled with this objection is the problem of congressional response to the work of a commission; in most cases, Congress is under no obligation to act, or even respond to the work of a commission. If legislators disagree with the results or recommendations of a commission’s work, they may simply ignore it.In addition, there is no guarantee that any commission will produce a balanced product; commission members may have their own agendas, biases, and pressures. Or they may simply produce a mediocre work product.46 cleardot

The CP has to have a solvency advocate for the type of commission they implement specific to the topic, avoids wanky, non-topic specific CPs.

**8. Mayer concludes aff – BRAC success was unusual.**

Mayer 7 – Kenneth R. Mayer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, December 2007, “The Base Realignment and Closure Process: Is it Possible to Make Rational Policy?,” online: <http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/Professional/Base%20Realignment%20and%20Closure%20Process.pdf>

There is simply far too much controversy over what sorts of reforms are necessary. Should benefits be protected, or should cuts be considered? Should taxes be raised, and if so by how much? Should benefits be means tested? The retirement age raised? What should the transition period look like? No legislator is likely to give up decision making rights in the presence of such controversy and uncertainty about the scope of the final policy. And this is how it should be. Automatic delegation comes at the cost of accountability, which as a policy value is at least as important as rationality and efficiency. Delegating authority to an independent body, or governing via an automatic rule, is often a “blame avoidance” mechanism designed to obfuscate the ultimate responsibility and make it difficult for voters to connect cause and effect. As we have seen with BRAC, sometimes this works, at least in the sense of producing a generally preferred but politically difficult outcome that cannot be traced back to the actions of any legislator or group of legislators. But delegation, by itself, does not resolve underlying disagreement and controversies, and the electorate ought to have enough information to assign blame or credit. Ultimately, BRAC arose from an unusual set of circumstances, and it should replicated with great caution.

### AT: K Eurocentrism – AT: Postcolonialism

Fw

**Perm do the plan and all non-mutually parts of the alternative**

**Turn—rejecting reform of institutions of domination makes the entire postcolonial project self-defeating**

**Dirlik 98** – Prof Social Science, History and Anthropology, U Oregon (Arif, The Postcolonial Aura, p ix, AG)

Postcolonial criticism has quickly spent its critical power, however, as its questioning of totalizing solutions has turned into exclusion from criticism of the historical and the structural contexts for the local, without reference to which criticism itself is deprived of critical self-consciousness and, as it celebrates itself, knowingly or unknowingly also **celebrates the conditions that produced it**. Whether postcolonial criticism has been appropriated by those who did not share its initial critical intentions is a moot question, as its methodological denial of structures and its methodological individualism has facilitated such appropriation. Rather than a critique of earlier radicalisms from the inside as initially intended, postcolonialism in its unfolding has turned into a repudiation of the possibility of radical challenges to the existing system of social and political relations. Its preoccupation with local encounters and the politics of identity rules out a thoroughgoing critique of the structures of capitalism, or of other structurally shaped modes of exploitation and oppression, while also legitimizing arguments against collective identities that are necessary to struggles against domination and hegemony.

**Focusing on colonial reps undermines the possibility of solving the root causes of their critique—this is an impact turn to their framework that only the perm can solve**

**Goss** **96** – Aboriginal Resource and Research Centre, New South Wales (Jasper, Postcolonialism, Third World Quarterly 17:2)

In some cases postcolonial theory has contributed to formulating new sets of ideas, but until there is a greater incorporation of the `material’ (whether real or hybrid) as a social force affected by and affecting discourses, rather than simply reducing all forms to textual discourses, much postcolonialism is doomed to an eternal present; a vicious circle that tells us `how’ something is, but contains deeply contradictory strategies of change since all dominating referents are self-determined. Perhaps it is better not simply to seek an either/or position in postcolonialism, but rather to work for projects of decolonisation that include self-reflexivity not based solely on discursive terms, but which occur with an acknowledgment that while, for example, colonialism can be a discursive form, discursive forms are also influenced by classes, genders and ethnicities, which despite their heterogeneous constructions and histories can still have force as structures and institutions.

**Postcolonialism falls into the same trap of representing others**

**Majid 1** (Anouar, Provincial Acts, http://65.107.211.206/post/poldiscourse/casablanca/majid1.html)

As established and practised in the Anglo-American academy, postcolonial theory has been largely oblivious to non-western articulations of self and identity, and has thus tended to interpellate the non-western cultures it seeks to foreground and defend into a solidly Eurocentric frame of consciousness. Postcolonial theory thus operates with the paradoxical tension of relying on the secular, European vocabulary of its academic origins to translate non-secular, non-European experiences. Despite brilliant attempts to elucidate (or perhaps theorize away) this dilemma, the question of the non-western Other's agency remains suspended and unresolved, while the material conditions that generate a culture of dubious virtues (such as "hybridity" and "identity politics") acquire more theoretical legitimacy.

**They replicate the error of representing others**

**Thomas 94** – senior research fellow, Australian National University (Nicholas, Colonialism’s Culture, p 158-9)

Critics of colonial discourse often write, unavoidably, from within the terrain that they wish to interrogate: as critics of and in the Western literary and theoretical canon, or as historians trained in one Western historiographic tradition or another. The claim and aspiration to speak in some sense from a native or colonized perspective has been intensively debated. If one speaks on behalf of ‘others’, there is a risk of creating false identifications and assimilating ‘their’ perspectives to one’s own; if one makes one’s own interest explicit, and is content only to speak about ‘them’ and ‘their’ self-representations, one may be accused of recapitu­lating what is seen as the paradigmatic exclusion of Orientalist discourse, namely constituting the presence of an author and an authority on the basis of the other’s absence. I do not wish to pursue these questions here, because their politics cannot be adequately registered through global terms such as ‘others’ and ‘authors’. It makes a difference whether an author is a historian, a cultural theorist, a film critic or an ethnog­rapher. It makes a great deal of difference, in particular, whether this author has produced his or her representations on the basis of sustained involvement with the people involved, and whether they therefore have particular expectations arising from that encounter. It also makes a difference who ‘they’ are; Tolai, Inuit, Chicanos and Tamils are not discursively interchangeable ‘others’ but peoples with very different locations, different access to state resources and education and different concerns. In one case they may regard it as highly inappropriate for anyone other than a member of the immediate community to narrate or represent their histories and identities; in other cases they may welcome the assistance of someone who is an outsider or partial outsider such as a diaspora-trained scholar. In these debates it sometimes seems to be assumed that colonial studies is primarily about ‘others’ — about representing ‘them’ in some way that is more acceptable politically, epistemologically and ethically. A number of writers have now pointed out that this fetishization of alterity easily recapitulates an us/them disjunction which has in fact long been fissured and cut across by migration and transactions in both directions. There is also a risk that it neglects the extent to which colonial studies cannot take the identities of colonists as an unproblematic reference point.

**Double bind—playing up the violence of colonialism discursively replicates this violence**

**Goss** **96** – Aboriginal Resource and Research Centre, New South Wales (Jasper, Postcolonialism, Third World Quarterly 17:2)

Gates argues that postcolonial theory has created its own double bind whereby one can choose to: empower the native discursively... downplaying the epistemic (and literal) violence of colonialism; or play up the absolute nature of colonial domination, [by] negating the subjectivity and agency of the colonised, thus textually replicating the repressive operations of colonialism. 29 The theoretical implications are that one is left in a constantly ambiguous position as to the impact of colonialism. Even Young, an admirer of postcolonial projects, must still raise the question, `of what, if anything, is specific to the colonial situation if colonial texts only demonstrate the same properties that can be found in any deconstructive reading of European texts’ .30 If the subaltern cannot speak (according to Spivak) and never will, then the situation we are left with is one that half-heartedly acknowledges the social ramifications of colonialism but has no way (or seeks none) of locating them within an historical project outside of `local’ discourses. Ahmad notes the impact of this theoretical turn by arguing that, `[colonialism ] thus becomes a transhistorical thing, always present and always in the process of dissolution in one part of the world or another, so that everyone gets the privilege, sooner or later, at one time or another, of being coloniser, colonised and postcolonial’.31 We have arrived at a situation where the difference between the coloniser and colonised is not only the result of colonial discourses but in fact can be turned around so that the coloniser is in fact colonised as well. There is no dispute that it is certainly desirable to make a critique of static and universalist categories (black, white, Third World, etc), but by seeking an eternal regress postcolonial theory problematises every category to the point at which it has no usefulness whatsoever. As Dirlik states: postcolonialism’ s repudiation of structure and totality in the name of history ironically ends up not in an affirmation of historicity but in a self-referential, universalising historicism that reintroduces through the back door an unexamined totality; it projects globally what are but local experiences.

**Postcolonialism is inevitably co-opted to legitimize colonialism**

**Dirlik 99** – Prof Social Science, History and Anthropology, U Oregon (Arif, How the grinch hijacked radicalism, Postcolonial Studies 2:2)

In the light of what I have observed above with reference to the re-evaluation of class formations in earlier national liberation movements, it may be understandable why postcolonial critics from formerly colonial societies should be reluctant to speak to issues of class, as they hail for the most part from classes that were(and are) suspect in the eyes of nativists. This makes it all the more imperative to speak to issues of class, however, as postcolonial elites are increasingly entangled in the transnational class formations produced by global reconfigurations. In the process, the postcolonial argument is mobilised to serve as an alibi for a cultural colonialism that is so thorough that it is nearly impossible to speak about it, as colonialism itself loses its meaning where it proceeds by consent of the colonised. However diluted in its dissolution of social differences into generalities about marginality or subalternity, the postcolonial argument even in its later phase initially retained concern for the underdog; as witness the affinity postcolonial critics have expressed with the Subaltern historians. By now, however, postcolonial criticism has become absorbed into institutions of power, its arguments appropriated by those who may feel marginal in certain ways, but represent new forms of power in others.

**They legitimize atrocity**

**Williams 97** – visiting fellow, Afrika-Studiecentrum (Adebayo, The postcolonial flaneur and other fellow-travellers, Third World Quarterly 18:5, AG)

Postcolonialism, as it is marked by the concept of hybridity, is a symptom pretending to be a diagnosis. The intellectual charms of contingency and the renunciation of agency have not stopped the agents of history. Hybridity did not stop three wars between India and Pakistan, despite the fact that the latter was hacked out of the former on the eve of independence. Indeed, neither has hybridity prevented the homogenous clans of Somalia from permanently waging war among themselves nor did it prevent the grotesque barbarity visited uponUS soldiers in that unhappy land. Hybridity or even assimilation did not confuse a superpower like France as to the real object and objective of its forty three documented interventions in `postcolonial’ Africa, and neither did it dissuade the Nigerian military authorities from executing Kenule Saro-Wiwa, who was making legitimate demands for his distinct nationality within the realities of a multinational Nigeria.

### 2ac science

#### Scientific predictions solve – defer to expert consensus

Sullivan 98 (Phillip A., professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Toronto’s Institute for Aerospace Studies, “An Engineer Dissects Two Cases Studies”, A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, edited by Noretta Koertge)

The Process of Scientific Discovery This story illustrates all the characteristics of scientific discovery, and two points are relevant here. First, unless there is political interference, flawed or weak arguments of even the most respected scientists are rapidly exposed. Furthermore, eager for recognition and priority, individual scientists are quick to promote novel explanations. Thus, when scientists finally do agree on the solution to a problem, this agreement is not solely the result of negotiation; it is forged by the evidence. The second point is that interpretation of this evidence is often complex, being in many ways akin to the assembly of an elaborate jigsaw puzzle. The result of any individual theoretical or experimental investigation is at best ambiguous, and its ultimate meaning is dependent on other investigations. In the initial assembly stages, the available puzzle pieces may suggest many interpretations and may provoke much controversy, so rhetoric and reputation can play major roles in persuasion. As additional investigations are undertaken, however, any consensus on interpretation that develops often has such compelling consistency or can allow such spectacular predictions that it becomes increasingly difficult to deny that it reflects objectivity. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/62417656) Finally, as the sound-speed story shows, for questions at the frontier of science, assembly of the puzzle may take decades and longer. It follows that to make a convincing case, advocates of relativism in science cannot simply point to the disputes and controversies surrounding a puzzle that is still being assembled. Rather, they must demonstrate that social factors have entered the content of Chalmers's "good science." For the purposes of this discussion, I understand "good science" to be those propositions that are part of an accepted scientific consensus and that have an established record of successful prediction. Both of the two case studies I examine here concern aspects of mature disciplines that, when used appropriately, are capable of making accurate predictions. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/62417656)

#### Science is key to check authoritarianism and solves a multitude of extinction scenarios

**Sokal, 4** (Alan D. Department of Physics New York University Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity)//ahayes

Finally, postmodern science provides a powerful refutation of the authoritarianism and elitism inherent in traditional science, as well as an empirical basis for a democratic approach to scientific work. For, as Bohr noted, ``a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view which defy a unique description'' -- this is quite simply a fact about the world, much as the self-proclaimed empiricists of modernist science might prefer to deny it. In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of credentialed ``scientists'' purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of scientific knowledge? (Let me emphasize that I am in no way opposed to specialized scientific training; I object only when an elite caste seeks to impose its canon of ``high science'', with the aim of excluding a priori alternative forms of scientific production by non-members.89) The content and methodology of postmodern science thus provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project, understood in its broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries, the breaking down of barriers, the radical democratization of all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life.90 Conversely, one part of this project must involve the construction of a new and truly progressive science that can serve the needs of such a democratized society-to-be. As Markley observes, there seem to be two more-or-less mutually exclusive choices available to the progressive community: On the one hand, politically progressive scientists can try to recuperate existing practices for moral values they uphold, arguing that their right-wing enemies are defacing nature and that they, the counter-movement, have access to the truth. [But] the state of the biosphere -- air pollution, water pollution, disappearing rain forests, thousands of species on the verge of extinction, large areas of land burdened far beyond their carrying capacity, nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons, clearcuts where there used to be forests, starvation, malnutrition, disappearing wetlands, nonexistent grass lands, and a rash of environmentally caused diseases -- suggests that the realist dream of scientific progress, of recapturing rather than revolutionizing existing methodologies and technologies, is, at worst, irrelevant to a political struggle that seeks something more than a reenactment of state socialism.91

#### Even if science is bad the alt is worse - Critiques of science will be exploited by groups interested in destroying the environment

Ted BENTONSociology @ Essex 5 in *After Postmodernism* eds. Jose Lopez and Garry Potter p. 137-138

Second, the post‑Kuhnian relativist aproaches to the sociology of science, in challenging the proclaimed finality and cultural authority of big science, saw themselves as on the side of 'the underdog', pressing for democratic account­ability on the part of the scientific establishment ‑ even for a thoroughgoing democratisation of knowledge itself. Sociologists of science have tended to see 'technoscience' as indissolubly tied to political and industrial power and domin­ation. To call into question its epistemological authority has been to undermine a key source of legitimation for established power. However, the politics of the critique of science become more complex and ambivalent in the face of the new ecological issues. While many Greens see the interests associated with technoscience as largely to blame for many ecological hazards, they also rely on scientific detection, measurement and theoretical explanations in making out the Green case. The construction of incinerators for waste disposal adjacent to working‑class estates, the noise and fumes emitted by heavy road‑traffic, the loss of treasured landscapes and so on, are forms of ecological degradation which are readily perceptible, and may enter directly into the discourses of popular movements. However, many other, often more sinister and catastrophic, forms of ecological transformation may only be detected by scientific instrumentation. Nuclear and other forms of radiation, low concentrations of toxins in food and drinking water, antibiotic‑resistant pathogens, shifts in the chemical composi­tion of the upper atmosphere and so on fall into this category. In other cases, the scale of transformation is what is ecologically significant and, here again, scientific modelling and measurement displace the evidence provided by the senses of necessarily localised human agents. Global climate change, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion are among the transformations which fall into this category. Finally, rational discourse about policy options depends on (but is certainly not restricted to) best‑available scientific thinking about the causal mechanisms involved(the 'greenhouse' effect, CO2 exchanges at the surface of the oceans, pholovvnthesis, mechanisms of cloud‑formation and many others in the case of dinsate 'hanged. To expose the normatively and culturally 'constructed' character of those scientific research programmes which have so far indcnt‑ifled, measured and explained the hazardous dynamics of ecological change is to run a serious political risk. The big industrial complexes, such as the biotech, pharmaceutical, agribusiness, petrochemical, construction and road transport sectors, together with their state sponsors, have a lifeline thrown to them. That the knowledge ‑base which exposes the ecological 'externalities' of their activities is culturally biased and epistemologically questionable is music to their ears. Why put the brakes on wealth creation and progress on the basis of such flimsy and questionable evidence (see R. Rowell, 1996, esp. chap. 5)? These misuses of the work of constructionist sociology of environmental science are often seen as problematic from the standpoint of its practitioners (see, for example, r} a special issue of Social *Studies of Science, 1996).* Of course, it would be quite posble to accept these implications of he approach, in the face of unwanied political consequences: perhaps the weakening or even abandoning of environmental regulation and technteal safety standards could be accepted as an appropriate response to the sociologied dchunking of en ironmental science. lot esnnglv, however, few constructionists would be happy with such an out­conic. the question is, can they coherently or consistently unhappy about it? Winne i9% and Burninghaio md. Coopei (1999) oiler sophisticated defences of their own variants of construe onism from this sort of 'realist' criticism. They claim, variously, that the 'taking of sides' in environmental conflicts is not necessarily the most productive role for social scientists to take, and that, not­withstanding rite realist [critique. it](http://critique.it) often possible to combine constructionism with cotmitiimmred cn'‑ironmen iahsns. These contributions deserve much fuller responses than I have space for here hot, as I shall argue below. dicnt are other reasons for scepticism about the more radical versions of constructionism.

#### Burden of proof is key --- other epistemologies cause extinction

**Coyne, 06** – Author and Writer for the Times (Jerry A., “A plea for empiricism”, FOLLIES OF THE WISE, Dissenting essays, 405pp. Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker and Hoard, 1 59376 101 5)

Supernatural forces and events, essential aspects of most religions, play no role in science, not because we exclude them deliberately, but because they have never been a useful way to understand nature. Scientific “truths” are empirically supported observations agreed on by different observers. Religious “truths,” on the other hand, are personal, unverifiable and contested by those of different faiths. Science is nonsectarian: those who disagree on scientific issues do not blow each other up. Science encourages doubt; most religions quash it. But religion is not completely separable from science. Virtually all religions make improbable claims that are in principle empirically testable, and thus within the domain of science: Mary, in Catholic teaching, was bodily taken to heaven, while Muhammad rode up on a white horse; and Jesus (born of a virgin) came back from the dead. None of these claims has been corroborated, and while science would never accept them as true without evidence, religion does. A mind that accepts both science and religion is thus a mind in conflict. Yet scientists, especially beleaguered American evolutionists, need the support of the many faithful who respect science. It is not politically or tactically useful to point out the fundamental and unbreachable gaps between science and theology. Indeed, scientists and philosophers have written many books (equivalents of Leibnizian theodicy) desperately trying to show how these areas can happily cohabit. In his essay, “Darwin goes to Sunday School”, Crews reviews several of these works, pointing out with brio the intellectual contortions and dishonesties involved in harmonizing religion and science. Assessing work by the evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould, the philosopher Michael Ruse, the theologian John Haught and others, Crews concludes, “When coldly examined . . . these productions invariably prove to have adulterated scientific doctrine or to have emptied religious dogma of its commonly accepted meaning”. Rather than suggesting any solution (indeed, there is none save adopting a form of “religion” that makes no untenable empirical claims), Crews points out the dangers to the survival of our planet arising from a rejection of Darwinism. Such rejection promotes apathy towards overpopulation, pollution, deforestation and other environmental crimes: “So long as we regard ourselves as creatures apart who need only repent of our personal sins to retain heaven’s blessing, we won’t take the full measure of our species-wise responsibility for these calamities”. Crews includes three final essays on deconstruction and other misguided movements in literary theory. These also show “follies of the wise” in that they involve interpretations of texts that are unanchored by evidence. Fortunately, the harm inflicted by Lacan and his epigones is limited to the good judgement of professors of literature. Follies of the Wise is one of the most refreshing and edifying collections of essays in recent years. Much like Christopher Hitchens in the UK, Crews serves a vital function as National Sceptic. He ends on a ringing note: “The human race has produced only one successfully validated epistemology, characterizing all scrupulous inquiry into the real world, from quarks to poems. It is, simply, empiricism, or the submitting of propositions to the arbitration of evidence that is acknowledged to be such by all of the contending parties. Ideas that claim immunity from such review, whether because of mystical faith or privileged “clinical insight” or the say-so of eminent authorities, are not to be countenanced until they can pass the same skeptical ordeal to which all other contenders are subjected.” As science in America becomes ever more harried and debased by politics and religion, we desperately need to heed Crews’s plea for empiricism.

#### Science self-correcting and valuable

Gleiser 11 (Marcelo, Professor of Natural Philosophy Dartmouth College, npr, Feb 9, http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2011/02/09/133591874/speaking-in-defense-of-science, JMB, accessed 6-25-11)

The danger of taking science too far, as in stating to the world that science has all the answers and can understand it all, is to lose its credibility when findings are doubted, or when "established" theories are supplanted by new ones. Much better is to explain how science goes about creating knowledge through a process of trial and error and constant verification by independent experimental groups. Our scientific knowledge of nature grows through a self-correcting accretion process. New theories emerge through the cracks in old ones. There is drama and beauty in this endeavor, as we struggle to make sense of the world around us. To deny what we've learned is to deny one of the greatest accomplishments of humanity. Our children deserve better than that. To not know is fine. To not want to know is disastrous.

### 2ac coloniality top

**Coloniality is inevitable and the attempts to singularize modernity discretely – the affirmative is a productive engagement to break down the negative effects of colonialism and the alternative reentrenches exclusion**

Pheng **Cheah** is Associate Professor of Rhetoric. **2006** http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies

Mignolo announces nothing less than a radical critique of modernity that seeks to situate it within what he calls “coloniality.” By the term “coloniality,” he seems to designate something that is much wider than the related historical projects of imperialism and colonialism. It refers to an epochal condition and an epistemological frame that binds these historical projects to modernity in an inseverable manner. Mignolo suggests that a totalitarian idea of totality is a key feature of modernity. Modernity conserves itself as a totality by positing an “outside” of Europe and the North Atlantic that is excluded from modernity through a discourse of racism. The rhetoric of modernity therefore leads inevitably to a logic of coloniality. This frame also engulfs the present and underwrites much radical thought that occurs under the rubric of “emancipation,” including Marx’s idea of a proletarian revolution as well as Toni Negri and Michael Hardt’s idea of the multitude, but also varieties of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonial theory. What Mignolo counterposes to this entire formation is a project of liberation that involves delinking from coloniality and modernity. He calls this project “decoloniality” and it involves generalizing the experiences of decolonization and anticolonial struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as the experiences of the damnés, the wretched of the earth, into a new epistemic frame. The project of decoloniality therefore involves a double gesture: first, the re-embodiment and relocation of thought in order to unmask the limited situation of modern knowledges and their link to coloniality, and second, an-other thinking that calls for plurality and intercultural dialogue, especially within the South. Mignolo’s manifesto is syncretically rich and wide-ranging in its scope and polemical reach. It traverses the discourses of philosophy and various social sciences and the humanities and also draws on radical activist discourse. But more importantly, it is so uplifting in its spirit of demagogic optimism that it is difficult to disagree with most of its exhortations. I would like to begin by focusing on a rhetorical gesture that runs throughout Professor Mignolo’s text. The single word title of the text, “Delinking,” is identical to a book written by the Marxist political economist, Samir Amin (Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World). Yet, Mignolo repeatedly distances his project from that of Amin (and all dependency theory) for at least two reasons. First, Amin only conceived of political and economic delinking, i.e. delinking in the sphere of political economy. He did not understand the urgent need for delinking at the epistemic level, the more fundamental level of thought. Hence, Amin’s project fails to break with the modern concept of totality. Second, and as a consequence of this failure to engage in epistemic delinking, Amin remains caught up in the modern disembodied universalistic project of Marxism. It is thus not really a radical delinking but only “radical emancipation within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality.” A different polemical critique is directed at the postcolonial theory of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Postcolonial theory may engage in the epistemic questioning of the concept of totality and may also be critical of modernity. However, since it is grounded on the poststructuralism of Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, it is still “a project of scholarly transformation within the academy” that remains internal to Europe. Unlike decoloniality, the postcolonial is not attuned to what Mignolo calls “other sources:” the critique and activism (“radical political and epistemological shifts”) of various important figures from Asia, Africa, and Latin America such as Gandhi, Cabral, and Fanon. What unites these two polemical gestures is a sense of the primacy of the epistemic in undoing coloniality. However, Mignolo also has a rather unusual understanding of the epistemic that gives it a special affinity to the damnés. On the one hand, a Marxist political-economic approach to delinking is not conceptual enough since it does not broach the fundamental level of thought. It fails to take over “epistemic power.” On the other hand, however, the intensely epistemic reflections of postcolonial theory remain too abstract and rarefied. “The epistemic locations for delinking,” Mignolo believes, “come from the emergence of the geo- and body-politics of knowledge.” In other words, the epistemic has to have a material dimension. But its materiality is not that of the structures of political economy but of the corporeal experiences of those who have been excluded from the production of knowledge by modernity. What I would like to focus on are not the details of Mignolo’s polemical criticisms, but instead the account of power implied by his understanding of the epistemic. What is put forward here is a logocentrism of power. For Mignolo, power, whether it is oppressive or liberatory, has a logic that we can chart, decipher, and ultimately correct. There is a logic of coloniality and it has to be counteracted by a logic of decoloniality. Delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not seek to reject modernity and its conceptual system because this is so widespread. It requires instead, Mignolo believes, “border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous.” Coloniality is ultimately always a failure of thought, of knowledge, or of a logic that is dangerous. This is also, in many respects, a top-down theory of power, where power is repressive and emanates from a totalizing source according to a logical design or plan. Events and occurrences up to and including the present are grounded in a logic that is dangerous or mistaken and that needs to be corrected by the intervention of other logics that emanate from the various subjects that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. It is at this point that the question of the re-embodiment and relocation of knowledge becomes crucial. For Mignolo admits that the project of epistemic delinking may sound “somewhat messianic.” I would say perhaps “idealistic” in the colloquial sense. However, he immediately asserts that it is “an orientation that in the first decade of the 21st century has shown its potential and its viability,” for example, in the various World Social Forums. Many historical examples of liberation are also adduced: the Amaru rising in Peru, the Hatian revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa. As opposed to the false other that modernity has invented as its exteriority or outside, the outside that it has excluded in order to create itself, these truly other voices introduce “other cosmologies into the dominance and hegemony of Western cosmological variations within the same rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality.” The logic of decoloniality was then explicitly thematized in the thought of radical Arabo-Islamic thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Ayatollah Khomeini and by philosophy of liberation in Latin America and by first-nation intellectuals. The stress is placed on the importance of “other” languages that have been negated by colonial modernity. The argument here is similar to the epistemology of location in feminist theory and critical race theory (for example, Luce Irigaray). I would like to end by posing two questions concerning the two main limbs of Mignolo’s argument: the primacy of the epistemic and the urgency of embodying and locating knowledge. First, does power in fact operate according to a logic and from a totalizing source that represses and subjugates those it has excluded in contemporary globalization? Is the link between modernity and coloniality primarily epistemic in character? It is interesting to note from this perspective that when Mignolo attempts to establish the epistemic link between modernity and coloniality, he relies on a historical biography and the fiction of a collective will or intention to dominate and colonize: “The rhetoric of modernity has been predominantly put forward by European men of letters, philosophers, intellectuals, officers of the state. The modern/colonial power differential was, of course, structured at all levels (economic, political, epistemological, militarily), but it was at the epistemological level that the rhetoric of modernity gained currency. If we had time to go into the biography of the main voices that conceived ‘modernity’ as the series of historical events….all of them would originate in one of the six European countries leading the Renaissance, the colonial expansion and capitalist formation, and the European Enlightenment.” In this view, development in the postcolonial world would be an ideological ruse of the logic of coloniality that forecloses the voices of marginalized peoples. Yet, one might argue that exploitative development in contemporary globalization operates not by racist techniques of exclusion and marginalization, but precisely by including, integrating, and assimilating every being into the circuit of the international division of labor. This is done by transforming them into reserve labor power through techniques of what Foucault called biopower. But we would here need to understand biopower in a different way from Mignolo’s understanding of biopolitics or body-politics, a difference that he also acknowledges. This different understanding of power as productive as opposed to repressive seems especially important in contemporary globalization where the flows of transnational capital fabricate the economic well-being of nation-states and their individual citizens. First, at the macrological level of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. In other words, the current state of power relations is an effect of multiple processes that are dynamic, heterogeneous, and unstable, processes that cannot be reduced to a single logic of coloniality, although the latter can emerge as their effect. What is the relation between these two different conceptions of biopolitics? Do they contradict each other? How would the wretched of the earth fit into this alternative cartography of global power that I have sketched? This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so. One would need to look at the true heterogeneity of the outside and the complex and multifarious technologies that fabricate these various outsides, not just at the level of a racist rhetoric of exclusion, but at the most concrete level of the production of the bodily needs and interests of subjects claiming alterity.

### Disad

#### Government-controlled science diplomacy solves – allows cooperation which bolsters soft power – multiple existential threats in the status quo means it’s try or die

Sackett 10 [Penny Sackett, Former Chief Scientist for Australia, former Program Director at the NSF, PhD in theoretical physics, the Director of the Australian National University (ANU) Research School of Astronomy and Astrophysics and Mount Stromlo and Siding Spring Observatories (2002 – 07), August 10, 2010, “Science diplomacy: Collaboration for solutions,” <http://www.chiefscientist.gov.au/2010/08/science-diplomacy-collaboration-for-solutions/>] WD

Now turn your attention to today’s reality. Almost 7 billion people inhabit the planet and this number increases at an average of a little over one per cent per year. That’s about 2 more mouths to feed every second. Do these 7 billion people have an impact on the planet? Yes. An irreversible impact? Probably. Taken together this huge number of people has managed to change the face of the Earth and threaten the very systems that support them. We are now embarked on a trajectory that, if unchecked, will certainly have detrimental impacts on our way of life and to natural ecosystems. Some of these are irreversible, including the extinction of many species. But returning to that single individual, surely two things are true. A single person could not have caused all of this, nor can a single person solve all the associated problems. The message here is that the human-induced global problems that confront us cannot be solved by any one individual, group, agency or nation. It will take a large collective effort to change the course that we are on; nothing less will suffice. Our planet is facing several mammoth challenges: to its atmosphere, to its resources, to its inhabitants. Wicked problems such as climate change, over-population, disease, and food, water and energy security require concerted efforts and worldwide collaboration to find and implement effective, ethical and sustainable solutions. These are no longer solely scientific and technical matters. Solutions must be viable in the larger context of the global economy, global unrest and global inequality. Common understandings and commitment to action are required between individuals, within communities and across international networks. Science can play a special role in international relations. Its participants share a common language that transcends mother tongue and borders. For centuries scientists have corresponded and collaborated on international scales in order to arrive at a better and common understanding of the natural and human world. Values integral to science such as transparency, vigorous inquiry and informed debate also support effective international relation practices. Furthermore, given the long-established global trade of scientific information and results, many important international links are already in place at a scientific level. These links can lead to coalition-building, trust and cooperation on sensitive scientific issues which, when supported at a political level, can provide a ‘soft politics’ route to other policy dialogues. That is, if nations are already working together on global science issues, they may be more likely to be open to collaboration on other global issues such as trade and security.